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NOTES.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - POLICE POWER - SLEEPING CAR
BERTHS-Two recent Wisconsin statutes relating to the closing of

upper berths in sleeping cars have been the subject of review by the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin and by the United States Supreme
Court.. In 19o7 an act was passed by the Legislature of Wisconsin
providing that "whenever a person pays for the use of a double
lower berth in a sleeping car, he shall have the right to direct
whether the upper berth shall be opened or closed, unless the upper
berth is actually occupied by some other person; and the proprietor
of the car and the person in charge of it shall comply with such direction." I This act was declared unconstitutional in the same year
""An Act . . . Relating to the Health and Comfort of Occupants
of Sleeping-Car Berths." Laws of i9o7, chap. 266, § i.
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by the Supreme Court of the state,2 chiefly, it seems, because the
option of raising or lowering the upper berth was left to the occupant of the berth below.3 In order to rectify this defect, the legislature in 1911 passed another statute 4 repealing the former act and
making the closing of the upper berth under the circumstances
above stated obligatory, instead of leaving to the choice of the passenger beneath.5 This second act was decided by the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin to be constitutional;6 but the question was
carried to the United States Supreme Court, 7 where in a recent decision by a divided court, the state court was reversed and the act
declared unconstitutional.
A statute of the nature of the one in question, if valid, would
fall within the class of acts which are justified under the polike
power of the State. This power has been defined as "the power
vested in the legislature by the Constitution, to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes,
and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to
the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare
of the commonwealth and of the subjects of the same." 8 It is an
exercise of this power to pass laws concerning the prevention of diseases, the adulteration of food, the sale of intoxicating liquors, the
employment of children, and other subjects of almost unlimited variety. The police power lies within that great body of powers reserved to the states, and not conferred upon the federal government. The power, however, must not be pushed beyond constitutional limitations, the chief of which is to be found in the Fourteenth Amendment.
The police power is thus inherent in the state as a matter of
self-preservation, and is to be exercised for the well being of
State v. Redmon, i34 Wis. 89 (i9o7).
'See opinion of Timlin, J., at p. ii6: "I consider the act in question
not a valid exercise of the police power, because committing to the discretion
of the occupant of the lower berth the matter of compelling either the raising or lowering of the upper berth negatives the idea that the law- is based
upon considerations of public health, peace, morals, or safety."
'Laws of 1911, chap. 272.
'The act reads as follows: "Whenever a person shall engage and
occupy a lower berth in a sleeping car, and the upper berth of the same
section shall be neither engaged nor occupied, the upper berth shall not be
let down, but shall remain closed until engaged or occupied."
'State v. Chicago, Mil. & St. P. R. R. Co., 152 Wis. 341 (1913).
YChicago, Mil. & St. P. R. P. Co. v. State of Wisconsin, 35 Sup. Ct. 869
(1915).
'Shaw, C. J., in Com. v. Alger, 6i Mass. 53 (i85), at p. 85. A concise
definition is given by Scott, J., in Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co., 7o
Ill. 191 (873), at p. i94: "The police power of the State is co-extensive
with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed 'the law of overruling necessity.' It is that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."
2
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society at large. Where the interest of the individual conflicts with
the interest of the general public, the latter must govern. This frequently raises a difficult question as to whether the interest of the
public really requires, in the particular case, that the interest of the
individual be submerged. Is the proposed' legislation an actual
benefit to the public? Does it benefit society as a whole, or only a
special class? Is it a sufficient benefit to justify the concomitant
injury to the individual, or is it too oppressive upon him in proportion to its advantages? Is it a necessity or merely a convenience?
These are some of the questions that must be considered in determining whether a measure is a permissible exercise of the police
power, or an unwarrantable invasion of private right.
In the case under discussion, at the very outset there was some
difference of opinion as to whether it is an advantage to the occupant of a lower berth in a sleeping-car that the upper berth be
closed. The trial court found: "The closing of the upper berth will
be a convenience to the person occupying the berth below." In the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, Mr. Justice Siebecker said, "In the
light of such common knowledge, the evidence in the case tends to
show that the effects of this regulation do contribute to the comfort
and convenience of the traveling public and thereby contribute to
pJromote their health and general welfare." But in the United
States Supreme Court Mr. Justice Lamar remarked, "It is a matter
of common knowledge that to let down the upper berth during the
night 9 would necessarily be an intrusion upon the privacy of those
occupying lower berths. For the glare of the lights and the noise
of lowering the upper berth would disturb any except the soundest
sleepers."
Assuming, however, that the finding of the trial court was correct, the question arises whether the act benefits the public generally
or only a particular class.Y0 It is true that not everyone has occasion to travel in sleeping cars; but it seems clear that the act in
its terms is general in its application, and that anyone of the public
may at will place himself within its purview.
But though the act may be beneficial, and though it may apply
to the general public, there remains this question: Is the benefit to
the public such as to justify the interference with the privileges of
the railroad company? In order to render a police measure constitutional the change to be effected need not be absolutely essential to
the welfare of society; it is sufficient that a convenience to the pub'I.e., in the event of its being engaged during the night.
1 See Lawton v. State, -52 U. S. 133 (1894), at p. 137: "To justify the
State in thus imposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals."
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lic will result." The statute in question undoubtedly would interfere with the railroad company's freedom to manage its own affairs
as it pleases; but the company has no legal right to such freedom,
and there are many other statutes which so interfere, and which
have been held to be constitutional.' 2 Therefore the mere fact that
the statute abridges the company's liberties does not of itself make
it objectionable. But there is a general limitation upon the police
power that its exercise must be reasonable, and not arbitrary or capricious. 18 In the field of reasonableness, however, personal opinion
is so large an element that unanimity in many cases is impossible.
Thus the decision as to whether or not the statute in question unreasonably curtails the power of the railroad to manage its own
business may very likely be influenced by remote considerations. '
The principal ground assigned for declaring the act unconstitutional appears to be that it is a taking of property without due
process of law. The carrier has a right to charge for the use of the
space occupied by the upper berth, and that right is the carrier's
property. The Wisconsin court, in discussing the point, declared
that the act did not deprive the company of the use of the berth,
but merely regulated the manner of such use. The United States
Supreme Court does not treat this consideration fully, and draws
the conclusion, without giving any definite reason, that the statute
takes the carrier's property without compensation. This, it is submitted, is difficult to comprehend. The company is not prohibited
from selling the space of the upper berth, or from allowing anyone
to occupy it; it is merely required to keep the berth closed when
neither engaged nor occupied. It is to be regretted that the Court
failed to state more clearly its reasons.
The decision no doubt will act as a check upon what might be
regarded as an unreasonable extension of governmental paternalism. It may or may not be proper; but the reasoning employed by
the court does not appear convincing. Unfortunately neither of the
dissenting Justices wrote an opinion.' 4 Moreover these two cases ir
are apparently the only ones in which the validity of such a statute
as the one under discussion has been passed upon by the courts.
E.E.
'Harlan, J., in Lake Shore & Mich. S. Rwy. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285
(1899), at p. 300: "The power of the State by appropriate legislation to
provide for the public convenience stands upon the same ground precisely
as its power by appropriate legislation to protect the public health, the public
morals or the public safety." The same doctrine was emphatically reaffirmed
in Chicago, Bur. & Q. Rwy. Co. v. People, 200 U. S. 561, 592 (19o6).
"E.g., an act regulating the speed of trains, Mobile & 0. R. Co. v. State,
51 Miss. 137 (1875); an act requiring depots at certain places, State v.
Kansas City, etc., Rwy. Co., 32 Fed. 722 (1887); an act prohibiting stoves

in cars, N. Y., N. H. & H. Rwy. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628 ('891).
"State v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510 (1911); Northern Pac. Rwy. Co. v.
State, 236 U. S. 585 (1914).
"Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice McKenna dissented.
I State v. Redmon, supra, note 2, and State v. Chicago, Mil. & St. P. R. R,
Co., supra, notes 6 and 7.

NOTES
INTERNATIONAL LAW-TRADING WITH THE

ENEMY-That the

present war has revived many problems of maritime law which are
of great interest to the student of Anglo-American law, and will
continue to do so, goes without saying. A recent case in the Prize
Court of England ' affords an opportunity for the consideration of
two closely related questions, which are interesting historically as
well as important practically, and which were raised for the first
time during the present conflict in that case, viz., the liability to
capture and confiscation of property of citizens of a belligerent state,
who are alleged to have had commercial intercourse with, or to have
been trading with the enemy, and, as a collateral question, the liability to forfeiture, during a conjoint war, in the Prize Court of one
state, of the property of the subject of an ally of that state, engaged
in trade with the common enemy.
That commercial intercourse between the citizens of belligerents
is forbidden by the mere operation of the law of war and is interdicted immediately upon the commencement of hostilities may be said
to have been a general principle of law in most of the countries of
Europe from the earliest times.' The rule is applied whether the
trading is done in a national or a neutral vessel and even though the
owners of the goods acted honestly and bona fide throughout.
Bynkershoek, in 1737, laid down the rule as being a universal principle of law thus: "Ex natura belli commercia inter hostes cessare
non est dubitandum." 3 Mr. Justice Story states the rule in this
fashion: "It is a fundamental principle of Prize Law, that all trade
with the enemy is prohibited to all persons, whether natives, naturalized citizens, or foreigners domiciled in the country during the time
of their residence, under the penalty of confiscation." 4 It has frequently happened that soon after the declaration of war intercourse
with the enemy has been expressly forbidden by proclamations and
legislative measures of the state, although this is not necessary to
the enforcement of the rule.5 Of course, the sovereign power may
license such trading, either by special license in individual cases or by
general laws on the subject.6
The principle is the same when applied to the property of the
subject of an allied state, who has been trading with the common
enemy. This rule is a corollary of the other; such trade is forbidden
both by the universal law of nations and by the express or implied
terms of the treaty of alliance. The former rule can be relaxed only
by permission of the sovereign power of the state; the latter only by
IThe Panariellos,112 L. T. 777 (1915).
'Valin: Comm. sur l'Ordoun. de la Marine, liv. iii, fit. 6, art. 3.
'Bynkershoek: Quaist. ur. Pub., lib. i. cap. 3. Duponceau's Transl. 23.
'Story: Prize Courts (1854 Ed.), 69.
'See Act April 13, 1861, § 5, 12 Stat. at Large, p. 257. Proc. of Pres.,
dated Aug. 16, 1861, 12 Stat. at Large, App. No. 9.
6 See Wheaton: Elements of International Law (8th Ed.), § 3o9, et seq.
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the permission
of the allied nations, according to their mutual
7
agreement.
By analogy to the principal rule, it would seem that insurances
on the enemy's property should also be prohibited. This is the general rule, and is of long standing. The ordinance of Barcelona, made
in 1484, expressly forbade such insurances to the made, directly or
indirectly.8 However, for a period of about fifty years, during the
last half of the eighteenth century, this rule, owing to Lord Mansfield's influence, was not applied by the common law courts of England, and insurances were recovered for cargoes which were
confiscated by the admiralty courts. For it must be noted that the
admiralty courts, during all this time, vigorously enforced the rule
prohibiting trading with the enemy.sa The result was a state of.
chaos, in which the courts of common law sanctioned and encouraged
the same acts which the courts 6f admiralty punished. Lord Mansfield gave as reasons for his decisions that the state was benefited
to the extent of the premiums received, that an opportunity was
afforded for obtaining knowledge of the enemy's movements, and
that these two benefits outweighed any aid which the enemy might
receive from the carrying on of trade. So in 1749, an insurance,
which had been made on an English vessel that had been sent to a
neutral port to be neutralized, and from thence to trade with the
enemy, under cover of the neutral flag, was held good.9 During the
Seven Years' War, the English were in the habit of insuring the
property of the French, even when bound from a French port to a
French colony or from one French port to another. "By this
means," says Valin, "one part of the nation restored to us, by the
effects of the contract of insurance, what the other took from us by
the law of war." 10 During the American War of Independence the
same rule was applied. In one case the ship was a Swedish ship,
laden for French account and bound directly from London to
Nantz. 11 In another the insurance on a French ship, sailing under
French convoy from a French colony to a port of France, was held
valid. 2 In a third the insurance was on English property, shipped
on board of a neutral vessel, employed in the trade between Ireland
and the enemy's colonies. 3
Finally, in 1794, the insurance cases of Lord Mansfield were
'Story:

Prize Courts, 69; Wheaton: Internatidnal Law, § 316.
Us er Contumes de la Mer., p. 118.
'a See The Ringende Jacob (1750); The Juffrow Louisa Margaretha
(1781); The Elizabeth (1789); and The Fortuna (1795) cited by Sir William Scott in his opinion in The Hoop, i Ch. Rob. 196 (1799).
Henkle v. Royal Excb. Ass. Co., I Ves. 317 (1749).
' Valiu's Commentaries, p. 32.
Planche v. Fletcher, Doug. 251 (1779).
Thellusson v. Ferguson, Doug. 361 (178o).
" Gist v. Mason, i T. R. 84 (Eng. 1786).
8 Cleirac:
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overruled and insurances on enemies' property were held void in
cases whose facts were similar in every way to the previous cases in
which they had been held good. 14 However, nothing was said as to
the legality or illegality of trading with the enemy.
In 1799, in the celebrated case of The Hoop, 5 which is now the
leading English case on this particular rule of maritime jurisprudence, the court of admiralty strictly applied the rule, although, if
ever extenuating circumstances existed, they did in this case. British
merchants were carrying on an import trade, in neutral vessels, with
Holland, which country had been occupied by the French, with
whom England was at war. Upon inquiry previous to the trading,
the merchants were told by the Commissioner of Customs at Glasgow
that a license from His Majesty was not necessary. The court, however, was of a different opinion and the goods were accordingly
condemned.
The case of Potts v. Bell, 16 decided in i8oo, was another instance
of an insurance on goods shipped from Holland to England. The
decision was in line with the cases which had overruled Lord Mansfield's rule and held that the insurance was void. The great significance of the decision, however, is that the court went further and,
following the admiralty court's decision in The Hoop," established,
as a principle of the common law of England, the unlawfulness of
trading with an enemy or with an enemy's country without license
of the Crown. The effect of the decision was to make identical the
rules as to trading with the enemy, as applied by the common law
and admiralty courts, and no similar distinction has since appeared
in the cases of the two courts.
The case of The Neptunus "8is a good illustration of the application of the corollary to the principal rule. While England and
Sweden, as allied states, were at war with Holland and France, the
English Prize Court condemned goods captured on a voyage from
the ports of Sweden to Amsterdam. In its opinion, the court said:
"If one state admits its subjects to carry on an uninterrupted trade
with the enemy, the consequence may be that it will supply that aid
and comfort to the enemy which may be very injurious to the prosecution of the common cause and interests of its ally."
In America, The Rapid 19 was the first case in which the
Supreme- Court was called upon to assert the rights of war as against
the property of a citizen and it still remains the leading American
case on the subject. A native American citizen, who had purchased
"Brandon v. Nesbitt, 6 T. R.
T. R. 35 (Eng. 1794).

uSupra, note 8a.

18 T. R. 548 (Eng. 18oo).
" Supra, note 8a.
"6 Ch. Rob. 4o3 (18o7).
"8 Cranch 155 (U. S. 1814).

23

(Eng. 1794); Bristow v. Towers, 6
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goods in England before the commencement of the War of 1812,
but had not received' them' when war was declared, hired a vessel
and sent it to an English island, halfway between Nova Scotia and
the United States coast, where the goods had been landed. While
returning with the goods the vessel was captured and the goods were
condemned on the ground that by trading with the enemy, they had
acquired the character of enemies' property. The Supreme Court
defined trading with the enemy as follows, and while the definition
is very inclusive, it has been universally followed: "If by 'trading,'
in prize law, was meant that signification of the term which consists
in negotiation or contract, this case would certainly not come under
the penalties of the rule. But the object, policy, and spirit of the
rule is to cut off all communication or actual locomotive intercourse
between individuals of the belligerent states. Intercourse inconsistent with actual hostility is the offense against which the operation
of the rule is directed." 20
During the Civil War the2 same rule was applied as to trading
between the North and South. 1
The recent case 22 in the English Prize Court has been no less
rigorous than its predecessors in the application of the long-estab-24
lished admiralty rule and the cases of The Hoop 23 and The Rapid
are cited with distinct approval. Pursuant to an existing contract of
sale of silver lead between a German and a French company, the
latter had chartered a Greek steamship, which was in process of
loading when war was declared. The loading continued for about a
week after the declaration of war, and the vessel cleared with its
cargo destined for the German company. Delivery was originally
to have been made in Germany, but at the outbreak of war, the
vendees ordered the bill of lading to be sent direct to their London
agency and delivery to be made in England. The vessel proceeded
to Swansea, where the cargo was seized by the British authorities as
prize subject to confiscation. The title to the cargo was in the
French company throughout. The court recognized that the shippers
had acted in good faith and believed that the shipment was proper,
since delivery was to be made in England, but nevertheless condemned the goods.
Although, as has been shown, the courts have refused to relax
the rule with the changing conditions of commerce and warfare, the
governments of the various countries have recognized that a strict
enforcement of the rule would divert all commerce, during a time of
" See also The Alexander, 8 Cranch I69 (U. S. 1814) ; The St. Lawrence,
8 Cranch 434 (U. S. 1814) ; The Julia, 8 Cranch I8I (U. S. 1814).
'Prize Cases, 2 Black 635 (U. S. 2862); The William Baggely, 5 Wall.
377 (U. S. I866).
'The Panariellos,supra, note i.
'Supra, note 8a.
' 4Supra, note ig.
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warfare, to neutral nations, and that the, subsequent crippling of the
commerce of the belligerents would be far more disastrous than any
aid which such commerce would give to the enemy.
During the Crimean War the rule was greatly relaxed, but it
was done by orders and proclamations in advance, professedly
relaxing a rule which otherwise the courts of prize would have been
obliged to apply. The Order in Council of April 15, 1854, permitted British subjects to trade freely at Russian ports not blockaded,
in neutral vessels and in articles not contraband, but not in British
vessels. The French orders were to the same effect, and the Russian
Declaration of April 19th permitted French and English goods to be
imported in neutral vessels. During the Spanish-American War
neutral vessels, laden with American-owned2 cargoes other than contraband of war, cleared for Spanish ports. 6
By German law, a license to trade is presumed, and explicit
notice is required to forbid specific kinds of commerce. Of course,
contraband trading is always prohibited.2 6 This view, that commercial intercourse should be allowed to go on between belligerents
except in so far as the necessities of national defence justifies its
suspension, achieved a notable triumph at The Hague Convention of
1907, when Germany succeeded in carrying an addition to the prohibitions of Article XXIII of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land. The translation in English is: "To
declare abolished, suspended, or inadmissible the rights of the subjects of the hostile party to institute legal proceedings." 27 British
and American authorities contend that this is merely for the guidance
of an invading commander, ' but the German opinion is that the
object of the prohibition was to prohibit such laws on the part of a
belligerent as would prevent an enemy subject from obtaining his
obligation from the
ordinary remedies for breach of contractual
29
tribunals of the other side in time of war.
The single instance in which a court has shown a tendency to
relax the rule occurred in Mathews v. McStea, ° a case in the United
States Supreme Court. At the outbreak of the Civil War, citizens
of New York and Louisiana were partners, and it was held that an
acceptance of a bill of exchange by the firm after the commencement
of hostilities but before the Non-Intercourse Proclamation of the
President was valid and bound all the members of the firm. Had
='Bordwell: Law of War between Belligerents, p. 203.
"Bentwich: Law of Private Property in War, p. 51.
' British Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous, no. 6 (I98), p. 55.
The Interpretation of Article XXIII (h); American
'Oppenheim:
Journal of International Law, Vol. II, p. 70.
'German White Book, Dec. 6, 1907, P. 7; Higgins, The Hague Peace
Conferences, pp. 263-265. See Lawrence: The Principles of International
Law (5th Ed.), § 143.
09i
U. S. 7 (875).
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the strict rule been applied, the mere outbreak of war would have
dissolved the partnership automatically. The court held that since
an Act of Congress and a Proclamation were provided, the necessary
intendment was that commercial intercourse should be legal until
expressly prohibited.
The principal case is silent upon the subject of The Hague
conventions and the contraband nature of the goods in question. The
English blockade of German ports, thereby attempting to cut off all
her commerce, may have had an influence upon the decision, but the
case admirably illustrates the statement of Mr. Hershey, 31 one of the
many modern writers who favor the more liberal rule, that "the
main obstacles to the growth of a more enlightened practice would
seem to be the existence of a number of contrary precedents embalmed in case law and the. hide-bound conservatism of AngloAmerican courts, which manifests itself in this as in every other
branch of jurisprudence." 3'
P.C.W.
JURORS-IMPEACHMENT OF VERDIcT-Prior to the year 1785,
when improper conduct on the part of a jury was urged as ground
for a new trial, it was customary to admit the testimony or affidavits
of jurors or others without much discrimination. 1 Such evidence
was naturally regarded with a certain suspicion, and its sufficiency
was often successfully contested,2 but its admissibility was not seriously questioned. In the year 1785, however, the attitude of the
courts on this subject underwent an important change. Lord Mansfield, in the leading case of Vaise v. Delaval3 laid down the broad
rule that for the purpose of securing a new trial, affidavits or testimony of jurors were inadmissible. As a result of the prestige of
Lord Mansfield and the respect accorded his decisions, courts were
not slow in adopting the rule of Vaise v. Delaval, and it became
the prevailing rule both in England and America.4
Recently this subject came for the third time before the Supreme Court of the United States in McDonald v. Pless," a case
forcefully illustrative of the inherent injustice of the so-called "quotient verdict." The plaintiffs, attorneys, were suing for the value
'Hershey:
Essentials of International Public Law, § 349.
"See Westlake: International Law, War, pp. 44-51; Holtzendorff:
Handbuch, vol. 4, 358 ff.; Mance: La Diclarationde Guerre (igog), chap. ii.
'Lord

Fitzwater's Case, Freeman K. B. 415 (Eng. 1675); Welish v.

Arnold, Bunbury 5,

(Eng. 1719).

'Prior v. Powers, i Keb. 811 (Eng. 1665).
s I T.

R ii

(Eng. 1785).

'Straker v. Graham 4 M. & W- 721 (Eng. 1839); Cluggage v. Swan,
4 Binn. 150 (Pa. 1811).
5238 U. S. 264, 35 Sup. Ct. 783 (I9'S).
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of legal services rendered. It was agreed among the jury that each
member should write down the sum to which he thought the plaintiff was entitled, and that the verdict returned should be onetwelfth part of the aggregate. The amounts written down ranged
from nothing to five thousand dollars. To the quotient, two thousand nine hundred dollars, objection was made by several of the
jurors who thought the amount excessive; but they yielded to the
argument that they should stand by their agreement, and a verdict
for that amount was returned. The court, in excluding the testimony of a juror sworn as a witness, said: "There is nothing in the
nature of the present case warranting a departure from what is unquestionably the general rule, that the losing party cannot, in order
to secure a new trial, use the testimony of jurors to impeach their
verdict." 6
Notwithstanding the fact that the decision of Lord Mansfield
has been followed almost universally, its wisdom has not escaped
severe criticism. Its origin is attributed by Professor Wigmore to
the old doctrine, long since discarded, that no witness shall be heard
to allege his own turpitude, 7 and this consideration appears to have
influenced the courts in some of the early American cases. 8 He
couches his criticism in the following terms: "A bailiff or other
court officer, who may have been present at the jury's deliberations,
may by universal concession prove their misconduct, though it is a
gross breach of duty (except in one or two jurisdictions) for him
to attend or overhear. Thus, not only does the rule tempt the
parties to seduce the bailiffs to tricky expedients and surreptitious
eavesdroppings; but the law, furthermore, while with one hand it
sanctimoniously puts away the juryman who reports his own misconduct done during the privacy of retirement, yet with the other
hand inconsistently invites to the same witness-stand the bailiff
whose shameless disregard of his duty, in intruding upon that
privacy, forms his own qualification as a witness, and the sole tenor
of his testimony. If there cannot be any principle in this rule, it
rule, it should at least possess logic."9
opinion of Lamar, J., at p. 785.
'Wigmore: Evidence, vol. IV, § 2352: "Here it [the doctrine nemo
turpitudinem suam allegans audietur] thrived,--apparently because new supposed reasons of policy were found, which buoyed up Lord Mansfield's rule
long after the general repudiation of that favorite maxim, which had for him
served apparently as its only justification."
"See opinion of Yeates, J., in Cluggage v. Swan, supra, note 4: "Jurors,
who would have been sworn or solemnly affirmed to give a verdict according to the evidence, come with a bad grace into a tribunal of justice to
prove their own dishonorable conduct, and affix a stigma on their companions who may be unheard in their defence."
'Wigmore: Evidence, vol. IV, § 2353, apropos to following statement
of Lord Mansfield in Vaise v. Delaval, supra, note 3: "The Court must derive their knowledge from some other source, such as some person having
seen the transaction through a window or by some other means."
6See
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It is interesting to observe that only a few courts have broken
away from the rule of Vaise v. Delaval. The dissenting courts have
placed as the criterion of admissibility in the case of such affidavits
the test whether or not the facts averred essentially inhere in the
verdict itself. Under this rule such averments as that a juror misunderstood the instructions of the court, or was mistakeri in his calculations or judgment, or was unduly influenced by some evidence
or remark is excluded, while no objection is made to averments that
the verdict was a "quotient" one or the result of chance. The argument in favor of such a rule can scarcely be better expressed than
in the language of the Iowa court in adopting it: 10 "To allow a
juror to make affidavit against the conclusiveness of the verdict by
reason of and as to the effect and influence of any of these matterg
upon his mind, which in their very nature are, though untrue, incapable of disproof, would be practically to open the jury room to the
importunities and appliances of parties and attorneys, and, of
course, thereby to unsettle verdicts and destroy their sanctity and
conclusiveness. But to receive the affidavit of a juror as to the independent fact that the verdict was obtained by lot, or game of
chance, or the like, is to receive his testimony as to a fact, which,
if not true, can be readily and certainly disproved by his fellowjurors; and to bear such proof would have a tendency to diminish
such practices and to purify the jury-room, by rendering such improprieties capable and probable of exposure and consequently deterring jurors from resorting to them."
The case under discussion assumes a peculiar interest inasmuch
as the attitude of the Supreme Court on this subject has not been
entirely dear. In Hyde v. United States,2 the last time in which
the question came before that court for determination, the misconduct alleged was a compromise between a faction of the jury
favoring acquittal and one favoring conviction, whereby the
conviction of one defendant was exchanged for the acquittal
of the other. In excluding the testimony of a juror to that
effect, the court said: "We think the rule expressed in Wright v.
"Wright v. Illinois Telegraph Co., 2o Ia. 195 (i866).
"This rule is followed in Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539 (1874); Harris
v. State, 24 Nebr. 803 (888); and Elledge v. Todd, i Humph. 43 (Tenn.
1839). In several western states statutes or codes make an express exception to the English rule in the case of verdicts which are the result of a
resort to chance. See Cal. Code, Civ. Pro., §657; Idaho Code C. P. 3524;
Gordon v. Trevarthan, 13 Mont. 387; Gaines v. White, i S. Dak. 434;
Texas Code, Crim. Pro. 1895, §817, par. 8; People v. Ritchie, 12 Utah i8o;
Ark. Dig. Stat. J904, § 2422. A "quotient verdict" has been held a "chance"
verdict within the meaning of such statutes; Dixon v. Pltns, 98 Cal. 384
(i93).
1225 U. S. 347 (i9).
USupra, note lo.
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Illinois Telegraph Co.13 should apply, that the testimony of jurors
should not be received to show matters which essentially inhere in
the verdict itself and necessarily depend upon the testimony of
jurors and can receive no corroboration." The Supreme Court
would appear in this case to have adopted the tule of the Iowa case.
Yet the Iowa court, under the rule laid down, admitted evidence to
show a "quotient" verdict while in McDonald v. Pless, the case under
discussion, such evidence was excluded. The court did, however,
say that there might be instances occurring in the gravest and most
important cases in which such testimony could not be excluded
without "violating the plainest principles of justice"; but it held
that the present case did not warrant a departure from the general
rule. By this decision it would appear that the formerly approved
rule of Wright v. Illinois Telegraph Co. was repudiated and the
whole subject of admissibility of such affidavits intrusted, to some
extent at least, to the discretion of the court.
As a matter of general policy it is suggested, in view of the
injustice to the party aggrieved by the jury's misconduct which the
broad rule of Vaise v. Delaval necessarily entails, that, if possible,
it ought to be relaxed.14 In McDonald v. Pless it is admitted that,
viewed from the standpoint of the party aggrieved, the argument in
favor of receiving such evidence is unanswerable. It is undeniable
that a number of the evils designed to be overcome by the broad
rule of exclusion are more than imaginary, and that it shuts off a
horde of frivolous reasons which are invaribly urged under a less
stringent rule,'5 and it is admitted that situations may arise where
the application of the rule of Wright v. Illinois Telegraph Co. might
prove difficult. But it is submitted that the Iowa rule, while protecting to a much greater extent the rights of the party injured by the
misconduct, violates no fundamental consideration of public policy.
While it is readily conceded that to admit reasons lying "in the
breast" of individual jurors, in their nature incapable of being con-

"A curious situation arose in the case of Dorr v. Fenno, 12 Pick.

520

In that jurisdiction after the jury have returned with their
verdict but before they are discharged, and while they are still a jury, the
court may interrogate them as to the grounds upon which they based the
verdict. In an irrelevant answer to a question put by the court, a juror

(Mass.

1832).

disclosed.that a "quotient verdict" had been resorted to. The court said:

"The jury may have been guilty of misbehavior, but if so, we have no
evidence of it, and can derive none from them." Obviously, although the
information was volunteered as a juror and not as a witness, the chief
justification of the rule, that it prevents jurors from being besieged and
annonyed after the trial is concluded, was here absent.
"A
recent Washington case demonstrates the frivolous reasons which
lax rules as to admissibility would invite. Affidavits averred, inter alia, that
one of the jurors, an elderly lady, was ill and agreed because of her illness;
that one juror stated that, when the case was tried upon a former occasion,
the trial judge granted a nonsuit; and that one of the jurors signaled from
the jury room to a woman in another office. All these affidavits, together
with counter-affidavits, appear to have been admitted by the trial court,
which refused a new trial. The refusal was sustained on appeal. Lindquist
v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., i5o Pac. 6Ig (Wash. rg15).

90

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

troverted, would lead to imposition and abuse, the admission of an
affidavit as to an overt act, observed by all the jurors, such as a
"quotient verdict," which, if false, can be refuted by counter-affidavits, is not open to the same objections. The possibility that jurors
should be induced, or even importuned, by the losing party to make
false affidavits as to a fact which the entire jury knows, seems remote
It is submitted that with due regard for the rights of the individual
litigant, unless it contravene some principle of paramount public
policy, such evidence should be admitted; and that no substantial
consideration of public policy is violated by the Iowa rule.
B.M.K.
LARCENY-FINDING OF LOsT OR MISLAID GoODs-The question
of under what circumstances the finder of goods may be guilty of
larceny, has not been answered by the courts as clearly or with as
complete unanimity as might be desired.
That the finder of lost, as well as of mislaid, goods may be
guilty of theft under certain conditions is a proposition well settled;"
and all the authorities apparently agree that there is a clear distinction between property merely mislaid, i. e., put down and left in a
place by mistake, and property lost.' This distinction is illustrated
by the different rules usually applied to the finder of lost goods and
to the finder of mislaid goods. In order to establish the charge of
larceny against the former, it is necessary to prove that at the time
of the finding, he had the felonious intent of appropriating the article
to his own use,3 and this depends upon whether he knew or had
reasonable means of ascertaining the owner of the lost article.4 On
the other hand, in the case of mislaid property it is sufficient to prove
that the finder had the felonious intent to misappropriate the article
at any time, subsequent to, as well as coincident with, the finding. 5
It therefore is of practical interest to discover the true distinction between goods lost and goods mislaid. That this is not always

'Ransom v. State, 22 Conn. 153 (1852); Com. v. Titus, ii6 Mass. 42
(1874) ; Brooks v. State, 35 Ohio St. 46 (1878). It has, indeed, been held that
lost goods, as distinguished from mislaid goods, cannot be the subject of
larceny. i Hawk. P. C. 33, § 3; Lawrence v. State, i Hump. 228 (Tenn. 1839).
Cf. Moorehead v. State, 9 Humph. 635 (Tenn. 1849), where a distinction
is drawn between lost inanimate property and lost animate property, the
latter being regarded as a possible subject of larceny.
'Reg. v. West, 6 Cox, C. C. 415 (Eng. 1854).
'Reg. v. Thurborn, i Den., C. C. 387 (Eng. 1849). The doctrine there
laid down, that if the original taking was without a felonious intent, though
followed by a felonious intent afterwards, the finder of lost goods is not
gu~ilty of larceny, has been assailed, Russell: Crimes, 4th Ed., Vol. II, p. i8o,

note t, but is now well established. Reg. v. Christopher, 32 L. T. Rep. i5o
(Eng. 1858); Brewer v. State, 125 S. W. Rep. 127 (Ark. igio). See 7
Am. LAW. REG. 38r.
'Reg v. Christopher, supra, note 3. State v. Pusey, 88 S. C. 313 (913).
'Wynne's Case, 2 East, P. C. 664 (Eng. 1786) ; Regina v. Pierce et al,
20 L. T. Rep. 182 (Eng. 1853); Griggs v. State, 58 Ala. 425 (1877).
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easy is illustrated in the leading English case of Regina v. Moore,'
where a ten-pound note was accidentally dropped in a shop and
picked up by the shopkeeper who had no reasonable means of ascertaining the owner. The judges, in discussing whether the note was
lost or nislaid, seemed to regard the case a§ strictly of neither the
one class nor the other, observing that it was lost in the sense that it
had been dropped out of the owner's purse, and that it was not lost
strictly because the owner knew where to find it. One text-writer remarks, rather epigrammatically, that goods are lost "when the owner
has no trace of them and they show no trace of the owner,' 7 and
another iconoclastically suggests that there is no substantial difference between lost and mislaid goods at all with respect to larceny.,
It would seem obvious that goods may be lost, and not mislaid,
though they contain marks indicating their owner, and that goods
may be mislaid, and not lost, though the owner has forgotten where
he placed them and has no trace of their whereabouts. It is equally
clear that there is a very real and substantial difference between lost
and mislaid goods.
It is submitted that the true test whether goods found were mislaid or lost is twofold, objective and subjective. First, the manner
in which the goods made their way to where they were found must
be considered; whether the owner voluntarily placed them there, or
whether they got there through no voluntary act on his part. If
put there by the owner, the goods remain in his constructive possession, and the keeper of the shop, bank or other place where they
were left is their proper custodian, rather than the person who
happens to discover them.9 A stranger removing mislaid goods has
therefore merely the custody of them, and a subsequent appropriation to the finder's own use is a taking with intent to steal and constitutes larceny.'0 On the other hand, if the article was lost, i. e.,
reached the place where it was found through no voluntary act of the
owner, he no longer has even the constructive possession of it, and a
person who removes it with no felonious intent at the time cannot
be guilty of larceny."
Having ascertained the manner in which the goods made their
way to the place where they were found, it then becomes necessary
to apply a subjective test, viz., whether the finder believed that the
goods.had been mislaid and that the owner would probably return
for them, or whether he believed that the goods had been lost, though
they were actually mislaid. Thus, Mr. Justice Coleridge, in the case
88 Cox, C. C. 416 (Eng. x86i).
' Wharton: Criminal Law, Ed. 1912, vol. II, p. 1364.
'Clark and Marshall: The Law of Crimes, Ed. 1912, p. 471.
'Kincaid v. Eaton, 98 Mass. 139 (1867); Hoagland v. Forest Highlands
Amusement Co., 170 Mo. 335 (1902).
"Rapalje: Larceny and Kindred Offences, § 49.
Queen v. Glyde, r8 L. T. (N. S.) 6r3 (Eng. 868) ; Hamaker v. Blanch-

ard, go Pa. 377 (879).
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of Regina v. Reed,12 said, inter alia:"3 "When the question is, with
what intent a person takes, we cannot help looking into his state of
mind; as, if a person take what he believes to be his own, it is impossible to say that he is guilty of larceny." If the goods were
apparently lost, but in fact mislaid, a person relying on the appearance of things may claim to have the case treated as one of lost
goods, 4 for on the question of intent a man mistaken as to the facts
is to be judged as if the facts were what he honestly believed them
to be. It is for this reason that the courts consider the place of
finding a material circumstance.' 5
The recent American case of State v. Courtsol'8 illustrates an
interesting phase of the question of the finding of mislaid goods. A
woman picked up by mistake a package of money left by the owner
on a seat of a street car, supposing that the package belonged to her,
and subsequently, upon discovering her error, she formed and acted
upon a felonious design to deprive the owner of his property and
convert it to her own use. She was convicted of larceny, and the
conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. Mr. Justice Thayer said, inter alia:'7 "Although the original taking may have been by mistake, as the accused claimed, and
without felonious intent, if she later, and after she knew that the
package belonged to another, and knew or had the means of knowing
who the owner was, formed and acted upon the felonious intent to
deprive the owner of it by appropriating it to her own use, this would
constitute a new and a felonious taking, and the accused would be
guilty of larceny.

.

.

.

The accused acquired no special prop-

erty in the mislaid package, if she picked it up by mistake, supposing
it to be her own. The owner was still constructively in possession
of it. She became a mere custodian of it for him, and when she
found that it was not her property it was her duty to hold it for and
return it to the owner. If, instead of this, she formed and acted
upon the felonious design to deprive him of it and convert it to her
own use, this was a taking from his possession and constituted
larceny."
The reasoning of the case is undoubtedly unimpeachable, 8 but
the decision, taken in connection with the established rules relating
ICar. & Mar. 3o6 (Eng.
'At P. 308.
14

1841).

State v. Swayze, ii Ore. 357 (1884).

'Griggs v. State, supra, note 5; Roundtree v. State, 58 Ala. 381 (1877).
1694 Atl. 973 (Conn. 1915). See also 63 UNIV. OF PENNA. L. REv. 9o8.
"At p. 975.
"In Regina v. Riley, 6 Cox, C. C. 88 (Eng. 1853) the court laid down
the same principle, Parke, B., saying, "The original taking, though by
mistake, was not lawful, but a trespass, upon which an action in that form
might have been founded; but it was not a felony, because there was no
intention to appropriate. There was, however, a continuing trespass up to
the time of appropriation, and at that time, therefore, the felony was
committed."
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to the finding of goods, indicates how finely drawn is the line. If
one takes an article that l:e supposes is lost, when in fact it is mislaid, he is not guilty of larceny if he subsequently forms and acts
upon an intent to convert it to his own use; 19but if he removes an
article that he supposes is his own, when in"fact it was mislaid by
the owner, he is guilty of larceny if he subsequently, upon discovering his mistake, forms and acts upon the design to deprive the
owner of the article by misappropriating it to his own use.
L.E.L.

WILLS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-CREDIBLE WITNESSES-One

of

the provisions of the Statute of Frauds 1 required every will of real
estate to be signed and attested by three or four credible witnesses.
The question as to who was a credible witness within the meaning
of the statute, arose very soon after its enactment. In an early case 2
Lord Mansfield said: "The epithet 'credible' has a clear precise
meaning. It is not a term of art appropriate only to legal notions;
but has a signification universally received. It is never used as
synonymous with competent." But the later English decisions took
the view that "credible" was synonymous with "competent" and that
the word was not 3used in its technical meaning, which was simply
"worthy of belief."' A competent witness in the technical sense was
4
one whose evidence was admissible.
Under the Statute of Frauds witnesses were required only for
wills passing real estate. The validity of such wills was tested in
common law courts, and the competency of the witnesses was determined by common law rules. Had the words "credible" and "competent" been given their technical meaning, a credible witness might
have been barred in an action to enforce the will, because he was
not competent to testify under common law rules; while a competent witness might have been prevented from giving testimony
because he was not a credible witness. It was to avoid such a
result that "credible" was generally construed as "competent."
Under common law rules a person interested in an action could
not be offered as a witness; therefore a person having an immediate
beneficial interest under a will was not a credible witness and could
not be an attesting witness thereto. In England an executor, however, since he receives no compensation by way of commissions,
could be an attesting witness," and in America the courts allowed him
" Supra, note 14.

Charles II (1677).
'Windhum v. Chetwynd, I Burr. 414 (Eng. 1757).
129

'Bettison v. Bromley, 12 East. 249 (Eng. 181o); In re Parrott, 2 Q. B.
155 (Eng. 18g1).
'Borgrave v. Winder, 2 Ves. 634 (Eng. 1795).
'Lome v. Jolliffe, I Wm.Black, 365 (Eng. 1762)4
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A trustee
to be a witness, even though he received compensation
could be an attesting witness to a will in which a devise was made to
him in trust for others. 7 An heir could act as a witness to a will
which gave him a smaller share of the estate than he would have
taken had the ancestor died intestate
But by the Statute of 25 George II an interested attesting witness was made competent to prove the will, but was prevented from
taking any benefit thereunder. Most of the American jurisdictions
have adopted this statute or have enacted similar statutes, though
there are a few States in which the old English rule is still in
force. Some of these States, however, have passed what are known
as Enabling Acts.9 In this connection it is interesting to note'a
recent case which arose in Delaware under the Statute of Frauds and
an Enabling Act. A will was offered for probate in which the beneficiary was one of the two attesting witnesses. It was held that the
proving of a will, if not technically an "action," was a proceeding
within the meaning of the Enabling Act and that the common law
disability of a beneficiary who is an attesting witness to the will was
removed. 10
The decision expresses the modem tendency to abandon the old
formalities required by the Statute of Frauds in the making of a
valid will. The early decisions prevented a beneficiary from being
an attesting witness because the common law courts refused to allow
an interested party to testify. That common law rule of evidence
having been abandoned, why should the rule longer be applied? It
might be answered, "To prevent fraud." In theory, attestation by
disinterested witnesses only might seem a strong guard in this
respect, but it is submitted that such a restriction does more in the
many cases to prevent the fulfillment of the true intention of the
testator than it does toward guaranteeing its execution.
It is proper and usual for a testator to give legacies to members
of his family and to his friends and such persons are also most likely
to be witnesses to his will. Should such circumstances be allowed to
overturn his deliberate intention in regard to the distribution of his
estate?
G.F.D.
'Wyman v. Symmes, 92 Mass. 153 (1865); Standley v. Moss, 114 Ill.
See also McDonough v. Loughlin, 2o Barb. 238 (N. Y.
App. 612 (914).
i855), where Mr. Justice Strong said, "It would be taking a narrow view

of the subject to suppose that the statute allowing a meager compensation

for what are too often unthankful services, can confer such a benefit as to
disqualify an otherwise competent witness."
'Marston v. Judge of Probate, 79 Me. 25 (1887).
'Clark v. Clark, 54 Vt. 489 (i88i).
'Generally the wording of the Enabling Act is as follows: "No person
shall be incompetent to testify in any civil action or proceeding whether at
law or in equity, because he is a party to the record or interested in the
event of the suit or matter to be determined."
" 0Hudson v. Flood, 94 Atl. 76o (Del. 1915).

